Jump to content

China (and others) on North Korea


Recommended Posts

also in the SCMP

 

Security returns to normal in Chinese capital as armoured train pulls out with head of restive state on board

 

564c15e8-31a3-11e8-9019-a420e6317de0_ima

 

Two sources, who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue, confirmed that the mystery guest was Kim.
“It wasn’t his sister, it was Kim himself,” one said.

 

. . .

 

The agenda of Kim’s visit – his first foreign excursion since coming to power in 2011 – is still unknown.

 

 

Link to comment

A more international perspective - and an interesting history lesson - from Chinafile.

Sergey Radchenko is a Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.

 

 

 

  • March 31, 2018

 

 

During his very last meeting with Mao, Kim told him that he was surprised by how badly the Vietnamese reacted to the Sino-American rapprochement. “I think they didn’t understand your revolutionary diplomatic line,” he said. Mao explained his decision to host the U.S. President: “It was mainly to reach out to the American people through Nixon.” Kim agreed: “That’s good. They have isolated China for decades. This is a huge victory. We are very understanding about it. We don’t know why [the North Vietnamese] are unhappy.” He reiterated: “This was a huge victory for China. China did not go looking for them. It’s a huge victory.”
Kim and Mao also discussed the personalities involved. “Kissinger is a very bad man, Nixon is better,” Mao told Kim. The latter agreed that Kissinger was “more wily.” There is little doubt, though, that should Nixon or Kissinger have decided to achieve a breakthrough in relations with North Korea, Pyongyang would have been most accommodating. Nothing would have raised Kim’s prestige as much as engagement with the United States.
One of the reasons that Kim Il-sung became much more accommodating—even deferential—towards Mao in the early 1970s was that he wanted to reach out to Washington through the Chinese leadership. A North Korean delegation was in Beijing at the time of Nixon’s visit, lobbying with the Chinese to arrange for the American withdrawal from the Korean peninsula as a part of the broader Sino-American rapprochement.

 

Much to Kim’s chagrin, the Chinese proved unwilling to put the Korean question high up on the agenda of their discussions with Nixon. The lesson of the early 1970s for North Korea was this: Never rely on your allies to look after your interests—they won’t. In the late 1970s, Kim tried to initiate direct contacts with the United States but without much success.

 

 

Link to comment
“This was a huge victory for China. China did not go looking for them. It’s a huge victory.”

 

 

Some of that article is not exactly in agreement with other accounts. There is an interesting biography of Mao, chilling in detail, about the real Mao. (Mao: The Unknown Story by writer Jung Chang and historian Jon Halliday). Among many myths about him was the rapprochement with the US. Nixon and Kissinger (mostly Nixon) bragged about he opened up China. In fact, Mao let him think that way. Chou en Lai approached Mao with the idea of having Nixon come to China and Mao agreed. So it was China who approached Nixon, not the other way around.

 

This has a summary of the book. I recommend it highly. Jung Chang wrote another book about China called Wild Swans. A very poignant read, another one I recommend.) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao:_The_Unknown_Story

 

And the reason North Vietnam was so angry about the visit was we were having a war with them and China was supporting North Vietnam. They worried that China would leave them high and dry with only the Soviets supporting them. North Vietnam and China had been and still are enemies for centuries. After the Vietnam War, they went at it with tanks and full army. China almost lost that one and would have if NV had more air support. China forgot that at the time, NV had the 4th largest army in the world.

Link to comment
  • 2 weeks later...

An unusual look across the border - from Reuters

 

A road trip along North Korea's border with China

 

fc617262-3fa8-11e8-b6d9-57447a4b43e5_ima

 

At one point, we randomly drove off the main road to find the border fence had become totally useless - its barbed wire folded and pinned back by a fraying piece of clothing so that an adult could easily pass. Behind it, on the banks of the river, three small boats seemed ready to ferry you over in no time. Unless you wanted to walk: The water is frozen solid at this time of the year.
On the other side was total, deep and enduring darkness, its silence challenged only by an occasional bicyclist chased by a dog on a dirt road, or a soldier carrying buckets of water from a frozen river. These souls – like the people I used to see on trips outside the capital Pyongyang - are often alone, gazing ahead of their feet, struggling under the weight.
. . .
Then, this being North Korea, came totally unexpected and confusing scenes. Just outside Linjiang, as the road started winding towards the mountains, we spotted people waist-deep in the river - a group of maybe 20 men wearing weird rubber orange suits, as if they were in a very old and very cheap sci-fi movie. We stopped immediately and I got my longest lens from the back of the car.
Locals said they were North Koreans – I saw military guards on the other side who closely monitored their work. As I was frantically taking pictures, Sue-Lin asked the Chinese what was going on. The locals said they were looking for gold.

 

Link to comment
  • 2 weeks later...

from the SCMP

 

The mountain’s collapse after five blasts may be reason behind North Korean leader’s declaration that he would freeze tests and shut down the site

North Korea’s mountain nuclear test site has collapsed, putting China and other nearby nations at unprecedented risk of radioactive exposure, two separate groups of Chinese scientists studying the issue have confirmed.

 

. . .

 

The mountain’s collapse and the prospect of radioactive exposure in the aftermath, confirms a series of exclusive reports by the South China Morning Post on China’s fears that Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test had caused a fallout leak.

 

Link to comment

Kim Jong Un SPEAKS! I saw a video of him actually speaking, but can't find it right now

 

HANG ON, WHAT LANGUAGE IS KIM JONG-UN SPEAKING?

Livestreaming reveals that the North Korean leader has a unique ‘Swiss-influenced’ accent, a result of his years studying at a German-language boarding school near Bern

Kim Jong-un’s multicultural accent stole the show as viewers around the world were able to hear the North Korean leader address South Korean President Moon Jae-in, with parts of the sessions livestreamed over the internet. South Korean viewers were surprised by Kim’s non-North Korean sounding “Swiss-influenced” accent. After all, he is the leader of the world’s most isolated country – one that has historically stressed ethnic and cultural purity.

 

. . .

 

“The biggest issues with communication between North and South Koreans tend to be colloquialisms and English loanwords. South Korean slang, particularly internet slang, usually involves words from English or other languages, or could be abbreviations of longer Korean phrases,” said Jenna Gibson, director of communications at the Korea Economic Institute.

 

. . .

 

“The biggest issues with communication between North and South Koreans tend to be colloquialisms and English loanwords. South Korean slang, particularly internet slang, usually involves words from English or other languages, or could be abbreviations of longer Korean phrases,” said Jenna Gibson, director of communications at the Korea Economic Institute.

 

 

 

Found it!

 

Link to comment

In the NY Times - this expresses my view EXACTLY. If you hit the pay wall, just try again after the 1st.

 

How to Understand What’s Happening in North Korea
nicholas-kristof-thumbLarge.png

By Nicholas Kristof

Opinion Columnist

 

As with any circus performance, it’s amazing to behold but not quite as billed.
As Kim Jong-un stepped into South Korea on Friday — the first North Korean leader to do so — let’s acknowledge that he has played a weak hand exceptionally well. Kim is now aiming to squirm out of sanctions, build up his economy and retain his nuclear arsenal, all while remaining a global focus of attention. It’s a remarkable performance.
. . .
President Trump’s tightening of sanctions and his belligerent rhetoric genuinely did change the equation. All this was meant to intimidate Kim, but it mostly alarmed President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and galvanized him to undertake successful Olympic diplomacy that laid the groundwork for the North-South summit meeting.
Kim then parlayed that progress into meetings with both Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, both of which reflected longtime North Korean goals. And on Friday Kim and Moon adopted a declaration promising “no more war,” “a new era of peace” and “complete denuclearization.”
Inspiring, but count me skeptical.
North and South Korean leaders have signed grand peace documents before, in 2000 and 2007, and neither lasted. In 2012, North Korea agreed not to test missiles and then weeks later fired one off but called it a “satellite” launch.
When North Korea talks about “complete denuclearization,” it typically means that the U.S. ends its alliance with South Korea, and then North Korea will no longer need nuclear weapons to defend itself. But the U.S. won’t give up the South. And North Korea has been pursuing nuclear weapons since the 1950s, and I don’t know any expert who thinks that it will genuinely hand over its arsenal.
On my last visit to North Korea, in September, a Foreign Ministry official told me that Libya had given up its nuclear program — only to have its regime toppled. Likewise, he noted, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq lacked a nuclear deterrent — so Saddam was ousted by America. North Korea would not make the same mistake, he insisted.
. . .
Kim’s game plan seems to be to sign pledges for denuclearization, leaving details to be worked out in follow-up talks, knowing that the pledges won’t be fully implemented and that there will never be intrusive inspections. This may be disingenuous on the part of North Korea, but that’s not terrible: It provides a face-saving way for both North Korea and the U.S. to back away from the precipice of war.
Trump and Kim both badly want a meeting, so expect North Korea to release its three American detainees in the coming weeks and to make soothing statements. Trump and Kim will present themselves as historic peacemakers as they sign some kind of declaration calling for peace and denuclearization, with some kind of timetable; Trump’s aides will then say that he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize more than Barack Obama did.
. . .
In the meantime, I’m guessing that the North will halt all nuclear and missile testing (hopefully, including short-range missiles), and will stop production of plutonium at its reactors in Yongbyon (North Korea may also claim to stop enriching uranium, but that’s more difficult to verify). In exchange, China and South Korea will quietly ease sanctions — and Kim will get what he has always wanted, the legitimacy of being treated as a world leader, as an equal, and as the ruler of a de facto nuclear state.
Both Kim and Trump benefit politically from that scenario, and for that matter so does the world: Hard-liners will fume that we’re being played and that the North is not verifiably giving up nuclear weapons — true — but it’s all preferable to war.
. . .
In the meantime, I’m guessing that the North will halt all nuclear and missile testing (hopefully, including short-range missiles), and will stop production of plutonium at its reactors in Yongbyon (North Korea may also claim to stop enriching uranium, but that’s more difficult to verify). In exchange, China and South Korea will quietly ease sanctions — and Kim will get what he has always wanted, the legitimacy of being treated as a world leader, as an equal, and as the ruler of a de facto nuclear state.
Both Kim and Trump benefit politically from that scenario, and for that matter so does the world: Hard-liners will fume that we’re being played and that the North is not verifiably giving up nuclear weapons — true — but it’s all preferable to war.
How does this end? The West’s plan is to drag things along until the North collapses. This may happen. The problem is that it was also the U.S. plan in 1994 in a previous nuclear deal.

. . .

 

In effect, the emerging framework is a backdoor route to a nuclear cap or to the “freeze for a freeze” solution that North Korea and China have previously recommended and that Trump has rejected. It may all fall apart. But it’s possible now to envision a path away from war, and for that even we skeptics should be grateful.

 

Link to comment

in the SCMP

 

I figure that the only real way out of the Korean situation is for them to agree, on their own, to unify under the South Korean government. I have NO idea if there's any chance of that happening.

China will not be part of next round of talks but both Koreas recognise they still need their neighbour’s support, according to senior envoy in Seoul

 

The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said both Koreas wanted to dilute Beijing’s influence over the peninsula, but they also recognised they needed China’s support because it was still a key player in the region.
Momentum is growing for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis and even reunification after South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed to end their six decades of hostility, though critics say their agreement lacks the road map or details needed to achieve these goals.

 

 

Link to comment

Just an idea: maybe Kim and NK have had it with being China's dysfunctional cousin. Maybe he went to China - his "communist" neighbor - and saw China enjoying Hyundai's and Samsung's and all manner of food and went home with a "I was dutifully in China's pocket and all I got was this lousy, poorly performing junior nuclear bomb" T-shirt.

 

Because the math says he could trade the nuke for all the benefits his south Korean brother has and latch onto their economic engine and leave the 50's behind. How to share power? It can happen, just like North Dakota and South Dakota do it.

Link to comment
  • Randy W changed the title to China (and others) on North Korea

Please sign in to comment

You will be able to leave a comment after signing in



Sign In Now
×
×
  • Create New...