Trump/Biden/Kissinger and Xi on China

[Randy W]

From the SCMP on Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/scmp/videos/359781217957149/

 

South China Morning Post

3 hrs ·

China and the US have spent the past week locked in trade negotiations. Here's what they have agreed upon so far.

 

 

 

https://www.facebook.com/scmp/videos/359781217957149/

[Randy W]

Pre-trade war tariffs and commerce to be restored is what I'm hearing - "Waving the white flag"

 

More to come soon enough

[Randy W]

from the SCMP on Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/scmp/videos/814971242173193/

 

 

South China Morning Post

9 hrs ·

Chinese people have a message for Trump

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.facebook.com/scmp/videos/814971242173193/

[Randy W]

This is a broad ranging, point-by-point, but fairly basic (and hard to summarize) summary of China since 2012 - a good read

 

In the Foreign Affairs magazine

 

 

The Problem With Xi’s China Model

 

Why Its Successes Are Becoming Liabilities

 

 

For all its successes so far, however, the Xi model, fully realized, may simply be too much of a good thing. Too much party control—perhaps too consolidated into Xi’s hands—has contributed to economic stagnation. The constant stream of often competing directives from Beijing has produced paralysis at the local level. In August 2018, China’s Finance Ministry reinforced an earlier directive calling on local governments to issue more bonds to support infrastructure projects to help boost the slowing economy; many local governments had been resisting the government’s call because the projects have low returns. That same month, however, Beijing announced that officials who failed to implement Beijing’s policies could lose their jobs or be expelled from the party.

Xi’s predilection for state control in the economy has also starved the more efficient private sector of capital. His desire for enhanced party control within firms led one state-owned enterprise head to quit; he commented privately that the party committees wanted to make decisions but wouldn’t take responsibility when they failed. Evidence of economic distress abounds. The government is deleting statistics from the public record, a sure sign that things are not moving in the right direction. One economist has suggested that growth in 2018 fell to 1.67 percent, and the Shanghai stock market turned in the worst performance of any stock market in the world. Birthrates, which correlate closely with economic growth and optimism, fell to their lowest rate since 1961. Beijing has pulled back on its air pollution reduction targets—after some noteworthy initial success—out of concern that pollution control measures might further slow the economy.

The economic downturn has also stoked social discontent. . . .

Xi’s consolidation of power has not only cost China’s economy but raised suspicions around its enterprises abroad. The deepening penetration of the party into Chinese business has caused all Chinese companies to be viewed as extended arms of the CCP. Foreign firms and governments no longer have confidence that a Chinese company—private or not—can resist a CCP directive. Because of this assessment, they are cautious about drawing technology made by the Chinese national champion Huawei into their critical infrastructure.

 

Even the Belt and Road project risks bending under the weight of its ambitions.

 

 

[Randy W]

from the SCMP

 

Lost in translation? How verbal mishaps and lack of Chinese-language document threaten US-China trade deal

• Misunderstandings and China’s concerns about being bullied have created distance, says Michael Pillsbury, an outside adviser to Donald Trump
• Having no Chinese-language text of the 120-page draft agreement Beijing was potentially agreeing to could present an obstacle

 

Asked by the South China Morning Post whether he was implying a trade deal would not come soon, Pillsbury replied: “Yes, I imply that.”

“In Chinese translation there are a lot of nuances and choices in how you phrase things,” he said.

Both sides leaked their demands during the trade talks in May last year – 28 demands from the US side and 10 from China. It put both leaders under domestic pressure to stand firm on their respective positions, which may have added to “misperception”, Pillsbury said.

But he did not rule out the possibility of concessions by China to reach a deal over the short term because Chinese leaders were “openly worried about instability and slow growth” domestically.

The Hudson Institute hosted US Vice-President Mike Pence’s speech in October, in which he said China had “chosen the path of authoritarianism, mercantilism and aggression”.

 

 

[amberjack1234]

China has come to a playing field on the world stage that they need to own up and start playing fair with the US. We have gone a long way to putting them where they are today.

 

The wife tells me from her reading the Chinese news sites that Xi is under a LOT of pressure from the party to stand firm and not relent. As someone else recently said "Its all about the Benjamins". They want to continue filling those basements with RMB or flying it down to Myanmar. A favorite place to laundry money. So the wife tells me. I can't read Chinese so I have to take her word for it.

[Randy W]

from the SCMP - an interesting perspective

 

What have North Korean nukes got to do with the US-China trade war? Everything

• Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un. They’re stuck in a three-way chess game in which two seemingly unconnected issues are being used as leverage
• Here’s what the endgame looks like

 

When Washington and Pyongyang resumed direct contact to arrange their first summit last March, Chinese diplomats had initially feared a loss of influence with Beijing’s often recalcitrant ally. Since then, Beijing has invited Kim to visit China on four separate occasions – in March, May and June last year and January this year – with two of the visits occurring just days before the Trump-Kim summits.

Each time Trump toughened his tone on trade, Kim was invited to visit China. Why? Because Beijing wanted to send a message to Washington that “you can’t negotiate with Kim without our help”.

Indeed, North Korea could not even survive without Beijing’s support, let alone stand up to the might of America.

 

 

Edited April 2, 2019 by Randy W
Oops - forgot the link (see edit history)

[Randy W]

from the China Law Blog and Beef Magazine

 

China trade negotiations complex, but nearing a win

As negotiations between the U.S. and China appear to reach the end, both sides have agreed on “real enforcement on both sides.” Here’s where the ongoing trade discussions likely stand.

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Mnuchin are scheduled to travel to Beijing the last days of April. Chinese Vice Premier Liu He is set to be in Washington the first full week in May. If a deal could be reached in early May, that would allow a couple of weeks of text wrap-up and legal finalizing before a signing summit the end of May or early June.

Mnuchin added that both sides have agreed on “real enforcement on both sides.” That includes detailed enforcement offices with serious budgets.

 

He also confirmed that agreement had been reached on preventing currency manipulation, similar to the one in the USMCA. In early April, China agreed to another purchase of soybeans, some 800,000 metric tons, and agreed to more closely monitor and limit exporting of fentanyl, the former move likely being a negotiating sweetener and the latter in response to a U.S. request.

One of the most difficult issues left to settle involves China’s subsidies for certain companies and industries, a practice quite ingrained in the country’s economy.

How and when the U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports will be removed is another sticky area.

 

. . .

 

The currency provisions are meant to prevent a country from manipulating its currency to favor exports over imports, which can end up negating the impact of a trade deal (“Pact Hems Beijing Currency Moves,” Wall Street Journal, 04/13-14/19).

The WSJ story, for the first time we’ve seen, quoted Fred Bergsten as indicating the U.S.-China pact could be structured as an “executive agreement,” rather than a free trade agreement. That would mean the deal wouldn’t have to be submitted to Congress for ratification.

. . .

In mid-March, Chinese hastily added provisions to a foreign investment bill regulating technology transfers or theft of intellectual property. . . .

However, several experts said the new law is really re-stating current policy.

“The China Law Blog” warns that this law does not address the real problem: China’s layers of government regulation requiring businesses to buy only products manufactured in China, (“China’s New Foreign Investment Law and Forced Technology Transfer: Same As It Ever Was,” China Law Blog, 03/21/19).

 

 

 

Well, they DID ban the sale of Land Wind vehicles

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-25/fake-chinese-range-rovers-barred-in-rare-mainland-court-victory

[Randy W]

This is all over the news - choose your own article if you haven't read it already - this is from the SCMP

 

In abrupt move, Donald Trump says 10 per cent China tariffs will rise to 25 per cent on Friday

• Trump announced the move on Twitter, suggesting he was not satisfied with the pace of negotiations
• Chinese President Xi Jinping’s top trade envoy, Liu He, returns to Washington this week for what could be a closing round of trade talks

 

 

 

Reaction from the Chinese side did not confirm the seemingly fixed deadline, and suggested that Beijing is resisting pressure from Trump’s team.

Taoran Notes, a social media account used by Beijing to release trade talk information and to manage domestic expectations, said the hints from the US side that next week’s 11th round of talks are a deadline is merely a trick “to increase tensions and generate pressure on the other side”.

“It’s the same tactic as the US threatening to raise tariffs. It is merely smoke and mirrors to exert extreme pressure [on China],” the post said. “You don’t have to take it seriously.”

 

 

[Randy W]

an update from the SCMP

 

Update: China reconsidering Liu He’s US trip with delay or cancellation both possible options, says source

• President Xi Jinping’s chief trade negotiator could travel to Washington on Thursday and then leave the following day, or the trip could be cancelled entirely
• Change in response to US President Donald Trump threatening to increase punitive tariffs on US$200 billion of imports from 10 per cent to 25 per cent on Friday

Another source said both sides remain committed to a final agreement, but Trump’s threat puts the Chinese delegation in a difficult position as any agreement could be perceived by the domestic audience as a capitulation to the White House.

 

Trump’s threat of additional sanctions on Chinese imports revealed his impatience due to a lack of sufficient concessions from China, with sources suggesting that President Xi Jinping vetoed additional concessions proposed by his negotiators.

 

[Randy W]

from the SCMP

 

‘Do not even think about it’: Beijing refuses to give in to Trump’s latest threat on trade tariffs

• Defiant China says effect of increased tariffs would be ‘manageable and foreseeable’

 

 

Beijing will not make concessions in trade talks in response to Donald Trump’s latest tariff threats, Chinese state media said in a commentary published a day after the US president announced increases in duties on Chinese goods.

“Things we think are advantageous for us, we will do it even without anyone asking,” People’s Daily reported on its WeChat account on Tuesday.

“Things that are unfavourable to us, no matter how you ask, we will not take any step back. Do not even think about it.”

 

. . .

 

The two sides reportedly face a deadlock over an enforcement mechanism.

While Trump agreed to suspend tariff increases in February, he said in his latest tweets he would also target a further US$325 billion of Chinese goods with 25 per cent tariffs “soon”, meaning nearly all Chinese exports to the US would be targeted.

 

 

[Randy W]

This is an excellent op-ed piece in the NY Times - hopefully, you'll have some free reading left this month

 

By Yi-Zheng Lian

Mr. Lian is a former lead writer and chief editor of the Hong Kong Economic Journal.

 

Xi Jinping Wanted Global Dominance. He Overshot.

China wasn’t ready for the trade war with the United States.

 

. . .

 

But those were easy stunts, performed in a country with no audible opposition and that bans “reckless” talk about the government. The trade war, on the other hand, is the first real occasion to assess Mr. Xi’s leadership capabilities. And his performance might not look so good, even if one discounts the setbacks related to the trade war.

First and foremost, Mr. Xi has utterly failed to manage the United States–Chinese relationship. In contrast, every Chinese leader since the founding of the communist state in 1949 had recognized the paramount importance of those ties, worked hard to improve them — and reaped huge benefits.

. . .

Why is all of this happening under Mr. Xi? History suggests an answer.

In the late 1950s, Mao began to challenge the Soviet Union’s leadership of the international communist movement, then a potent force that hoped to overturn the United States-led world order. Mao was also seeking global dominance, in line with the traditional concept that the emperor of the Middle Kingdom was the rightful ruler of “tian xia” (天下), everything under the heavens. But Mao overreached; China wasn’t strong enough for that then. The Soviet Union’s decision to scrap aid programs to China and pull out its scientific and technological advisers there dealt a severe blow to China’s underperforming socialist economy.

Like Mao with the Soviets, Mr. Xi may have challenged the global leadership of the United States too hard and too soon.

 

[Randy W]

The same article for free on MSN - well worth a read

Xi Jinping Wanted Global Dominance. He Overshot.

 

 

A third criticism of Mr. Xi is that under him, China has sponsored or condoned actions by Chinese citizens and entities worldwide that have damaged the country’s international reputation while degrading its own moral fabric.

Take intellectual property, for example. The United States seems to have hard evidence that it was the policy of Huawei, a flagship Chinese high-tech company, to reward employees for I.P. theft. And, as I have written before, such a policy is encouraged, arguably even mandatory, under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law.

Traditionally, the ideal Chinese state is a Confucian state that adheres to strict moral and behavioral norms. Yet for all his cracking down on corruption at home, Mr. Xi has encouraged moral turpitude abroad; his vision of China is a nation of patriotic thieves. All Chinese arguably have lost face as a result, and now innocent people overseas may be dismissed out of hand as guilty by association.

Mr. Xi is widely seen as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. After the Constitution was amended last year, he could be president for life — unless his serious failures of leadership give his opponents at home enough reason to cut him short.

Yi-Zheng Lian, a commentator on Hong Kong and Asian affairs, is a professor of economics at Yamanashi Gakuin University, in Kofu, Japan, and a contributing opinion writer.

 

 

[Randy W]

https://www.facebook.com/globaltimesnews/photos/a.123349831079259/2301077003306520/?type=3&theater

[amberjack1234]

I think that China might just be gathering enough sidekicks to weather the storm. Where will that lead the US to? Will a lot of US firms come back home in light of less taxes and more tariffs on goods made in China and being exported to the US. With all the chest thumping made by Xi I don't think he can back down now. Then there is Trump.