The Perfect Dictatorship

[Randy W]

A new book, covering the Xi Jinping administration, that you may or may not be interested in. I think I'll pass, myself, since I expect it's pretty much the author's point of view (who's else would it be, right?). He seems to be primarily political (Democracy) and economic

 

from Wikipedia -

Stein Ringen (born July 5, 1945) is a Norwegian sociologist and political scientist. He is Professor of Sociology and Social Policy at the Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford, and a Fellow of Green Templeton College, Oxford (formerly Green College, Oxford). Ringen holds a magister degree in political science (a 7-year degree including 3 years of research) from the University of Oslo (1972) and a dr. philos. degree from the University of Oslo (1987).

 

 

The Xi regime is definitely different from the Hu Jintao regime which preceded it - don't let anyone tell you that it's the PARTY that makes the decisions, that it doesn't matter WHO is premier.

 

So this book may be of interest, but more so at an introductory level. Let me know what you think. At Amazon. The reviews aren't helpful, in my opinion.

 

The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century Paperback – September 6, 2016

by Stein Ringen (Author)

 

By analyzing the leadership of Xi Jinping, the meaning of "socialist market economy," corruption, the party-state apparatus, the reach of the party, the mechanisms of repression, taxation and public services, and state-society relations, The Perfect Dictatorship broadens the field of China studies, as well as the fields of political economy, comparative politics, development, and welfare state studies.

 

 

[Allon]

Noted. I will give it a shot.

[Randy W]

Another point of view - from the WSJ

 

China’s ‘Core’ Conundrum: Policing the Party’s Watchers

New directives centralize control over discipline inspectors nationwide and impose greater supervision on regional governments, some of whom have used their local clout to evade Beijing’s scrutiny. Guidelines spell out how cadres should supervise each other at nearly every level of the party hierarchy—except at the very top.

The regulations entrench Mr. Xi’s growing use of party disciplinarians as political inquisitors, enforcing party loyalty and compliance with his agenda. His targets, political observers say, are rivals and foot-dragging bureaucrats who hamper, or even resist, his policy edicts.

Tightening party discipline is part of Mr. Xi’s bid to reverse “a creeping usurpation of authority by local party bosses,” said Andrew Wedeman, a professor at Georgia State University who studies governance and corruption issues in China.

Mr. Xi believes the party will be weakened unless he can effectively fight corrupt local networks, Mr. Wedeman said. “The struggle to strengthen the party’s internal integrity is a struggle to save the heart of socialism in China.”

Since becoming party chief in late 2012, Mr. Xi has used a withering anticorruption campaign to shake up the bureaucracy, kick out rivals and amass power. In the process, the party’s disciplinary agencies have acquired significant muscle and expanded their targets to officials who show disloyalty or resistance to the central leadership.

But Mr. Xi has also faced pushback from parts of the party, the military and state-owned industry. High-level discord over economic policy has compounded the problem, creating bureaucratic paralysis as officials await clarity on policy priorities.

“Many of the party’s policies can’t get implemented. Some people even run independent kingdoms in their own units, departments and localities,” Deng Maosheng, a director at the party’s Central Policy Research Office, told reporters this week. “The higher-ups have policy measures, but those below have countermeasures.”

. . .

But for all the additional oversight, some significant gaps remain. The party didn’t impose meaningful checks on the powers of its top leaders. It “will never get there without fundamental political change,” said Ling Li, a visiting professor of Chinese legal history at the University of Vienna.

The directives rely on top leaders to regulate themselves in good faith, without effective enforcement mechanisms, according to Ren Jianming, a professor at Beihang University in Beijing who studies governance and anticorruption issues. “These rules only have an advocacy effect.”

 

 

 

So back to my own belief, which is that Xi's strengths lie in consolidation of domestic power, while his weakness lies in foreign relations, and even those with provinces such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet. His overall effect on the economy remains to be seen in a long term sense.

[Randy W]

. . . and the SCMP

 

Xi Jinping warns Communist Party would be ‘overthrown’ if Taiwan’s independence push left unchecked

President tells KMT chief Chinese people would overthrow Communist regime if island’s push for formal separation permitted, media reports say